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I
INTRODUCTION

"I can resist everything except temptation," opined the pundit Oscar
Wilde.' Similarly afflicted, the authors of this article have followed in Wilde's
way. Our temptation is the plethora of state court tests for assessing the
validity of subdivision exactions and the emerging application, or potential
application, of these disparate tests to the more recent phenomena of user
impact fees and linkage. Our response to this siren's seduction is an attempt
to unite these judicial standards, and to distinguish between traditional
subdivision exactions, contemporary user impact fees, and linkage in applying
our unified test. Thus, this article endeavors to create a unified universe of
which it can be said, "and then there was one."
To ensure proper application of the judicial test set forth in this article, it
is necessary to define and categorize the three governmental restrictions
addressed herein. Accordingly, the definitions adopted by the authors and
appropriate examples of each restriction are as follows:
1.

Subdivision Exaction -

Traditional construction, dedication, or in-lieu-fee payment

for site-specific needs imposed at the time of subdivision. These improvements are
usually categorized as being "minor" in scope and cost, and are typically provided onsite. Examples include subdivision streets, sidewalks, trails, utility easements, and
open space.
2. User Impact Fee - More recent device to fund major, off-site infrastructure
expansion imposed at the building permit stage. Examples include expansion or
improvement of sewage treatment facilities, landfills, primary roadways, schools, and
active recreational parks.
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3. Linkage - Emerging technique of off-site development impact exaction, imposed
at the certificate-of-occupancy stage upon large-scale mixed use or nonresidential
developments, to promote social programs or policies. Examples include low- and
moderate-income housing and job training.

It is a fundamental premise that, as municipalities grow, there is a
continual need for new public improvements as well as for maintenance and
expansion of existing infrastructure and public service facilities. Local
jurisdictions have traditionally been responsible for the provision of major
infrastructure improvements such as roads, schools, parks, sewage, and
drainage facilities. Financing of these improvements has come from general
revenues, most notably the real property tax, and through issuance of general
obligation bonds which are repaid from local property tax revenues. Another
primary source of infrastructure financing has been federal grant and subsidy
programs, including the following:
-the Environmental Protection
Agency Grant Program for the Construction of Waste
2
Water Treatment Facilities;
3
-the Economic Development Administration Public Works Program;
-the Department of Housing and Urban Development Community and Urban
Development Grant Programs 4 and housing subsidy programs;
-Department of Transportation highway programs; and
-Urban Mass Transit Administration programs for public transit.

Because of the increasing unavailability of, or changing priorities for,

federal, state, and local funds for public improvements, however, local
jurisdictions have looked for new ways to finance these systems. Such
phenomena as cutbacks in many of the aforementioned programs, limitations
on local government's access to tax-free industrial revenue bonds as an
economic development resource, and the uncertain specter of GrammRudman legislation 5 have cast a pall upon the availability of federal funds in
the foreseeable future. Similarly, state programs such as California's
Proposition 13,6 and local enactments like the tax reform voter referendum
(called "TRIM") in Prince George's County, Maryland, 7 have contributed to
the problem.
One method for overcoming these fiscal constraints has been to rely on
subdividers to construct or provide funds or land for improvements within the
subdivisions they create, or to compel developers to contribute to the
financing of off-site area-wide improvements at the time building permits are
issued. Subdividers and developers, however, have not been reluctant to
challenge these exaction measures in the courts. The challenges focus upon

the authority of municipalities to impose these exactions and fees and the
constitutionality of the devices themselves.
2. 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.800-.845 (1986).
3. 13 C.F.R. §§ 305.1-.8 (1986).
4. 24 C.F.R. §§ 570.1-.913 (1986).
5. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control (Gramm-Rudman) Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C.
§§ 901-07, 921-22 (Supp. III 1986).
6. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA (1978).
7. PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CHARTER art. VIII, § 817B (1978).
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State courts have developed several tests for determining the
constitutionality of exactions. These tests include the "reasonable
relationship," "specifically and uniquely attributable," and "rational nexus"
tests, as well as various combinations and permutations thereof. Although
originally designed as tests for assessing the validity of subdivision exactions,
these same tests have recently been applied to user impact fees and will likely
be applied to the newest type of government imposed restriction, linkage. As
noted, user impact fees and linkage regulations are now being used in new
ways to help fund improvements necessitated by development in the region as
a whole, rather than to address needs more directly attributable to a particular
subdivision. As a result of this change in scope and purpose, the traditional
judicial tests used to examine the constitutionality of subdivision exactions
must be reevaluated. It is necessary to ascertain their continued validity in
view of the expanded use of on-site exactions, as well as the advent of user
impact fees and linkage.
A.

Historic Evolution

The land dedication requirement, a form of subdivision exaction, was the
first device used by local governments to shift improvement costs to
subdividers and new residents. 8 Early subdivision control ordinances
required subdivision plats to be approved and recorded. 9 Requirements that
land be dedicated to the local government for streets, sidewalks, rights of way,
utility easements, and drainage systems were often imposed as conditions on
approval of these plats.10 The belief that the landowner's ability to subdivide
his property was a privilege rather than a right justified this practice.lI The
concept of dedications for on-site improvements, without compensation, has
generally been upheld by the courts. 12
From the dedication of land for on-site improvements, municipalities
progressed to requiring the construction and dedication of on-site
improvements.' 3 For example, at one time a town might have required a
subdivider to dedicate land for public use, and the town itself would build the
streets. Today, the municipality is more likely to require that the subdivider
build the streets and then dedicate them to public use. 14 This measure has
also received general judicial approval. 15
8.

Pavelko, Subdivision Exactions: A Review ofJudicial Standards, 25 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP.

L. 269, 272 (1983).
9. See D. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAw 262 (1982).
10. See Juergensmeyer & Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local Governments' Capital Funding
Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 415, 418 (1981).

11.

Pavelko, supra note 8, at 283.

12.

See id. at 273; Shultz & Kelley, Subdivision Improvement Requirements and Guarantees: A Primer, 28

WASH. Uj. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 68 (1985).

13.

Shultz & Kelley, supra note 12, at 68.
D. MANDELKER, supra note 9, at 267-68.
15. E.g., Ghen v. Piasecki, 172 N.J. Super. 35, 410 A.2d 708 (App. Div. 1980); see also Heyman &
14.

Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents through
Subdivision Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1122 (1964).
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The next development in subdivision exactions required that developers
provide land for on-site school and park purposes. Initially, these
requirements did not receive the imprimatur of the courts.' 6 Although these
dedications were for on-site improvements, the improvements would benefit
members of the whole community, not just subdivision residents. As they
have become more customary, however, courts have increasingly approved
these requirements.' 7 This approval is premised on the rationale that
residents of the new subdivisions will benefit from their proximity to the new
facilities and open space. In addition, the developer may be able to charge
higher sales prices and reap greater profits because of the amenities he has
provided. 18

Another form of subdivision exaction, the in-lieu fee, developed as a
refinement of the dedication requirements.' 9 Many subdivisions were too
small to be wholly responsible for the need for new schools, or to provide
dedications appropriately sized for school sites, yet each subdivision
contributed to the need for increased educational facilities. Municipalities
therefore determined that the developer should pay in-lieu fees when land
dedication was not practical. 20 These fees are now also used to fund
recreational and other types of facilities that are located off-site. 2 1 In-lieu fees
have not received unanimous approval from the courts. In some cases, they
22
are classified as taxes and found to exceed the authority of the municipality.
In other cases, however, they are upheld as valid exercises of the state's police
power. 25 Furthermore, some jurisdictions have even required off-site
24
construction of lesser facilities in conjunction with subdivision approval.
Like in-lieu fees, these off-site exactions for minor public improvements have
25
also received ambivalent responses from the courts.
B.

Recent Trends

The most recent exaction devices imposed on developers by local
governments are the user impact fee and linkage. The user impact fee is
similar to the exaction in-lieu fee, but, as previously noted, its application is
broader and more flexible. For example, user impact fees may be used to
help fund area-wide projects such as large-scale sewage, water, and public
16.

SeeJuergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 10, at 416 n.6.

17.
18.
19.

See id. at 418 n.16.
See id.
Id. at 418.

20.

Pavelko, supra note 8, at 278.

21.

Id.

22. E.g., City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363 (Ala. 1978); Town of
Longboat Key v. Lands End, Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Sanchez v. City of Santa
Fe, 82 N.M. 322, 481 P.2d 401 (1971); Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Or. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
23. See Pavelko, supra note 8, at 278-79.
24. D. MANDELKER, supra note 9, at 268.
25.

See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949); see also Arnett v. City of

Mobile, 449 So. 2d 1222, 1224 (Ala. 1984) (city required to compensate developer for reservation of
land outside subdivision for future street when lots not sold "pursuant to the plat of the future
thoroughfare").
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safety facilities. 26 In addition, although exaction dedications and in-lieu fees
are required when subdivision plans are submitted, user impact fees are
collected later in time, usually when building permits are issued. As a result,
the funds generated by user impact fees become available for governmental
use at a period closer to the time when the additional services will be
demanded. 27 Yet another difference between the measures is the method
used to calculate the appropriate amount required. In-lieu fees are usually set
at the value of a percentage of acreage. The calculation of user impact fees is
generally based on the square footage of proposed buildings, or the number
of bedrooms or living units in a development. Thus, user impact fees can be
applied to condominium, apartment, and commercial developments, uses to
28
which exaction in-lieu fees are typically inapplicable.
Courts have treated user impact fees in a fashion similar to that commonly
accorded in-lieu exaction fees. Impact fees are either held unconstitutional as
30
unauthorized taxes, 29 or are supported on police power rationales.
Generally, however, challenges to the validity of user impact fees do not
succeed under the current judicial tests applied in subdivision exaction cases.
3
Linkage is a new concept that courts have not yet addressed in depth. '
Now used in Boston and San Francisco, and proposed in Chicago and other
cities, this technique seeks to obtain private sector assistance for the provision
of low- and moderate-income housing, and has been suggested for other
social programs such as job training.3 2 These linkage programs link the right
to construct new large-scale mixed use or nonresidential developments to the
26. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 10, at 419-20.
27. D. MANDELKER, supra note 9, at 272.
28. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 10, at 419. For a description of the many advantages of
impact fees, see id at 420.
29. E.g., Broward County v. Janis Dev., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); VendittiSiravo, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 39 Fla. Supp. 121 (Cir. Ct. 1973); West Park Ave., Inc. v. Ocean
Township, 48 NJ. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966); Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982); Hillis
Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 97 Wash. 2d 804, 650 P.2d 193 (1982) (superseded by WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 82.02.020 (Supp. 1987)).
30. E.g., Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976) (impact fee
Valid under police power but struck because of insufficient restrictions on use of funds collected),
reconsidered on appeal from unpublished remand, 358 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (amended
exaction held legal), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979); Hollywood, Inc. v.
Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 888
(Wyo. 1983). See generally Connelly, Road Impact Fees Upheld in Noncharter County, 58 FLA. B.J. 54
(1984).
3 1. See Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit Assessments and Linkage
Payments: A BriefHistory of Land Development Exactions, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1987, at 5. In
April 1986, a lower court in Massachusetts struck down the city of Boston's linkage program, holding
that the City Council lacked the legal authority to approve it, and that the fee was a tax not
authorized by the state constitution. Bonan v. General Hosp. Corp., No. 76438 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 31, 1986) (order granting summary judgment). The Massachusetts Supreme Court later
reversed the lower court decision on procedural grounds. See Bonan v. City of Boston, 398 Mass.
314, 496 N.E.2d 640 (1986).
32. See BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE art. 26 (1983), amended by BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE
art. 26A (1986); San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 358-85 (Aug. 18, 1985). For a discussion of the San
Francisco ordinance, see Share & Diamond, San Francisco Office-Housing Production Program, LAND USE
L. & ZONING DIG., Oct. 1983, at 4, 4-6; see also Smith, supra note 31, at 25-28.
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provision of new housing. 33 For example, San Francisco has developed a
formula, based on the number of workers expected to occupy the proposed
office space, to calculate the amount of housing a developer is required to
help provide.3 4 Thus, the requirement is directly tied to needs purportedly
generated by the new office development.
Linkage is an extension of the impact fee concept.3 5 Through linkage,
municipalities are attempting to finance new housing and social programs in
the same way that they finance new public facilities.3 6 The constitutional
validity test discussed in Section IV of this article can therefore be applied to
linkage programs, as well as to user impact fees and subdivision exactions.
As noted, local governments have heretofore relied primarily on long-term
debt financing, federal grants, and real estate taxes to finance new public
facilities.3 7 However, as public funding has been cut back 3 and the need for
more advanced facilities has arisen, 3 9 municipalities have been forced to find
other means of funding those facilities. Recent national economic recessions,
combined with attempts to balance the federal budget without increasing
taxes, have contributed to the decrease in federal funding of state and local
infrastructure improvement projects. 40 Simultaneously, taxpayer pressure on
all levels of government to reduce expenditures has resulted in corresponding
state and local funding cutbacks. 41 Furthermore, since the federal share of
capital investment actually increased during the 1970's,42 the current reduced

availability of federal funds has particularly aggravated the fiscal problems of
local governments. In addition to the need for new facilities, there also is
currently a great need for maintenance expenditures along with large capital
debts to repay.
Increasingly, local governments are experimenting with new devices, such
as user impact fees and linkage, in an attempt to impose larger public
improvement burdens on the private sector.4 3 Simultaneously, there is
33. Smith, supra note 31, at 25.
34. San Francisco, Cal., Ordinance 358-85 (Aug. 18, 1985); Smith supra note 31, at 25-27; see
Connors, Development Exactions: Attack and Defense 473, 477 (July 22, 1985) (unpublished paper
presented at the ALI-ABA Land Use Institute, Aug. 13-16, 1985, Boulder, Colo.).
35. Smith, supra note 31, at 25; Connors, supra note 34, at 475.
36. Keating, Linking Downtown Development to Broader Community Goals, 2 J. AM. PLAN. A. 133
(1986).
37.

BUILDER AND ASS'N SERVICES Div., NATIONAL Ass'N OF HOME BUILDERS, IMPACT FEES: A

DEVELOPER'S MANUAL 3, 4 [hereinafter NAHB DEVELOPER'S MANUAL]; 2 P. ROIAN, ZONING AND LAND
USE CONTROLS § 9.01[1] (1986); Urban Land Inst., Financing Local Infrastructure in a Time of Fiscal
Constraint, URB. LAND, Aug. 1983, at 16, 17-18. [hereinafter ULI Statement].
38. According to the Urban Land Institute, infrastructure investment decreased by 44% from
1968 to 1983. ULI Statement, supra note 37, at 16.
39. There have been increased requirements geared to health and environmental protection. At
the same time, population and economic growth have continued to increase as the baby boom
generation grows older. Id. at 18.
40. ULI Statement, supra note 37, at 16.
41. Id.; NAHB DEVELOPER'S MANUAL, supra note 37, at 3.
42. ULI Statement, supra note 37, at 17.
43. NAHB DEVELOPER'S MANUAL, supra note 37, at 3; ULI Statement, supra note 37, at 16, 18.
There are several problems with this increased reliance on the private sector. First, in the long run,
the cost of financing infrastructure improvements will be greater because short-term capital is costly
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growing confusion in the courts about how to evaluate the constitutional
validity of these new measures. Several divergent tests for evaluating the
validity of subdivision exactions have developed in the state courts. The
standards imposed by these state court tests range from judicial deference
toward the legislative enactments to the stringent requirement that the need
for an exaction be specifically and uniquely attributable to a proposed
subdivision. Furthermore, these state tests fail to draw a discernible
distinction between traditional subdivision exactions and user impact fees.
Yet the different degree of burden imposed by the regulations should compel
the reviewing courts to distinguish between them. User impact fees involve
large-scale, off-site regional public facilities, the need for which is not directly
attributable to a particular subdivision. Moreover, the cost of such facilities
may become prohibitive to the consumer and ultimately exclusionary for
certain economic classes.
In addition, there is no federal test for evaluating the validity of
subdivision exactions or user impact fees. Although some decisions have
been appealed to the United States Supreme Court, they have been dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question. 4 4 Thus to avoid further confusion,
state and federal courts alike should adopt a single, flexible test for evaluating
the constitutional validity of subdivision exactions, user impact fees, and
linkage.
This unified test should consider and balance the divergent equities and
interests of government, developers and consumers, the last of whom will
ultimately pay for these public improvements. If properly designed and
implemented, such a test, as applied to exactions, fees, and linkage, would
resolve the challenge posed by Edwin Markham in "Man-Making":
Why build these cities glorious,
If man unbuilded goes?
In vain we build the world,
45
Unless the builder also grows?

The task at hand is thus to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the
community while recognizing the legitimate interests of developers and
consumers.
and difficult for developers to secure. Second, the additional time required to obtain the funds to
pay the impact fees will lead to increases in developers' costs and housing prices. Third, the
additional cost, delays, and uncertainty will act as a disincentive for economic development. Fourth,
in many cases, service standards will be lowered. Finally, municipal control over the design, timing,
and quality of facility development will decrease. NAHB DEVELOPER'S MANUAL, supra note 37 at 5;
ULI Statement, supra note 37, at 18-19.
44. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 630 (1971), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1972); Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Board
of County Comm'rs, 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 976 (1984);
Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965), appeal dismissed, 385
U.S. 4 (1966). However, a case is presently pending before the United States Supreme Court in
which a subdivision exaction is at issue. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm., 177 Cal. App. 3d 719,
223 Cal. Rptr. 28, prob. juiis. noted, 107 S. Ct. 312 (1986).
45. E. MARKHAM, Man-Making, in THE GATES OF PARADISE AND OTHER POEMS 20 (1920).
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II
TRADITIONAL JUDICIAL TESTS

A.

Statutory Authorization

Typically, challenges to exaction dedication and fee requirements, as well
as to user impact fees, initially assert that the local government does not have
the authority to impose such a requirement. Because all local power is
derived from the state, the court will look to the applicable state enabling
legislation to determine whether the state has authorized the locality to
require exactions or impact fees from subdividers or developers, respectively.
The court must also look at local ordinances to determine what types of
subdivision exactions or user fees are authorized. 4 6 In some instances, even if
there is no express authorization, courts will find implied authority. 4 7 In
jurisdictions that adhere to Dillon's Rule, 4 however, the powers of local
governments will be construed narrowly, and an exaction or fee not expressly
authorized or necessarily implied from such express authorization will not
49
survive judicial scrutiny.
Generally, courts have upheld requirements that subdividers provide
internal street and public facility improvements. 50 Requirements of this type
are expressly authorized in the Standard City Planning Enabling Act 5 1 and in
most state statutes. 5 2 However, exactions for parks, schools, minor off-site
improvements, and in-lieu fees, as well as off-site user impact fees, are rarely
expressly authorized by state legislation. 53 Some state courts, including those
in New Jersey and Utah, have found implied authority for some types of off46. See, e.g., Kamhi v. Planning Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 385, 452 N.E.2d 1193, 465 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1983);
Riegert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd., 57 N.Y.2d 206, 441 N.E.2d 1076, 455 N.Y.S.2d 558
(1982); see also P. ROHAN, supra note 37, at § 9.04[2] (1986); Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision
Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52 Cornell L.Q 871, 887-88 (1967).
47. See, e.g., Savonich v. Township of Lawrence, 91 N.J. Super. 288, 219 A.2d 902 (Law Div.
1966).
48. Dillon maintains that:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses and can
exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; second,
those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those
essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corporation-not
simply convenient, but indispensible.
1 J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911).
49. See, e.g., Hylton Enters. v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 258 S.E.2d 577 (1979).
Several other courts have held that clear statutory authority is required. E.g., Krughoff v. City of
Naperville, 41 Ill. App. 3d 334, 354 N.E.2d 489 (1976), aff-d, 68 11. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977);
Middlesex & Boston St. Ry. v. Board of Aldermen, 371 Mass. 849, 359 N.E.2d 1279 (1977);
Arrowhead Dev. Co. v. Livingston County Rd. Comm'n, 413 Mich. 505, 322 N.W.2d 702 (1982);
Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Kansas City, 555 S.W.2d 832 (Mo. 1977); West Park Ave., Inc. v.
Ocean Township, 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966); Kamhi v. Planning Bd., 59 N.Y.2d 385, 452 N.E.2d
1193, 465 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1983); Reigert Apartments Corp. v. Planning Bd., 57 N.Y.2d 206. 441
N.E.2d 1076, 455 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1982).
50. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 15, at 1122.
51.
STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT tit. II, § 14 (1928).
52. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 9, at 262, 267.
53. Id. at 268.
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site exactions. 54 Other courts, such as those in Virginia and Nebraska, have
55
held that there is no implied authority to require off-site improvements.
B.

Constitutionality Tests

Once a court has determined that the municipality has the authority to
impose the exaction or fee, it will assess the constitutionality of the regulation.
This inquiry focuses on the relationship between the regulation and the needs
generated by the proposed development. Requirements for improvements
within a subdivision will usually survive constitutional scrutiny under a needbenefit test. For example, in Blevens v. City of Manchester,5 6 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court found that it is reasonable to impose on the subdivider the
cost of "improvements which are of special benefit to the subdivision," since
the subdivider, rather than the municipality, creates the need for the
57
improvements.
When the improvements serve members of the general public as well as
residents of the subdivision, it is more difficult to assess their constitutionality.
Subdividers and developers frequently assert that these regulations constitute
takings of property without compensation in violation of the U.S. Constitution
or state constitutions. 58 To answer this charge, courts must consider the
particular regulation in its context. They must determine whether the
regulation is a valid exercise of the state's police power 59 or whether it is an
unconstitutional taking in contravention of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments .60

The original rationale underlying subdivision control was a theory of
voluntariness. Developers were viewed as voluntarily choosing to subdivide
their land and subject themselves to the conditions imposed by local
54. E.g., Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 66 N.J. 582, 334 A.2d 30 (1975) (drainage facility
improvement); Call v. City of W. Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979) (flood control, parks, or
recreation facilities).
55. E.g., Briar West, Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 206 Neb. 172, 291 N.W.2d 730 (1980); Hylton
Enters. v. Board of Supervisors, 220 Va. 435, 258 S.E.2d 577 (1979).
56. 103 N.H. 284, 170 A.2d 121 (1961).
57. Id. at 286, 170 A.2d at 122-23.
58. See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 15, at 1126-30; see also Krambeck v. City of Gretna, 198
Neb. 608, 254 N.W.2d 691 (1977); Van Dissel v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light, 152 N.J. Super. 391,
377 A.2d 1244 (Law Div. 1977).
59. Local governments, as subdivisions of the state, may exercise the state's police powers.
Thus, they are empowered to protect the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. See
Pavelko, supra note 8, at 280 n.60; see also R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE §§ 15.1, 15.10 (1986) [hereinafter R. ROTUNDA].
60. The fifth and fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution prohibit the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV. For a general
discussion of takings, see R. ROTUNDA, supra note 59, at § 15.12; see also F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES &
J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973). The law concerning the taking issue is now very confused. See R.
ROTUNDA, supra note 59, at §§ 15.12(b), (d), 15.14; Williams, Smith, Siemon, Mandelker & Babcock,
The White RiverJunction Manifesto, 9 VT. L. REV. 193, 225-33 (1984); Berger & Kanner, Thoughts on The
White RiverJunction Manifesto: A Reply to the "Gang of Five s" Views onJust Compensationfor Regulatory
Taking of Property, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 685 (1986); see also Bauman, The Supreme Court, Inverse
Condemnation and the Fifth Amendment: Justice Brennan Confronts the Inevitable in Land Use Controls, 15
RUTGERS L.J. 15 (1983).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 50: No. I

government. 6 ' However, as the goals these controls were intended to
promote have changed, the underlying rationale has progressed "from
'voluntariness,' to 'privilege,' to the 'police power'." 62
Although the right-privilege distinction has generally been abandoned in
constitutional law, some courts still employ it when deciding exaction and
impact fee cases. 6 3 These courts hold that the subdivision of land is a
privilege granted to the subdivider or developer by the municipality and is
subject to any requirements the municipality may impose. 64 More often,
however, courts employ one of the following three tests: reasonable
relationship, specifically and uniquely attributable, or rational nexus. In
applying these tests, courts consider the relationship between the regulation,
the benefits derived from the improvements, and the need for the
improvements created by the subdivision.

1. The Reasonable Relationship Test. In 1949, in Ayres v. City Council,6 5 the
California Supreme Court formulated a flexible test to determine the
constitutionality of subdivision exaction land dedication requirements. Its
reasonable relationship test considers whether the proposed development will

contribute to the problem sought to be alleviated by imposition of the
regulation. 66 This test has since been characterized as one that, when applied,
tends to result in approval of the requirements. 6 7 Application of this test,
however, does not result in approval in all cases. 6 8
The Ayres court considered the needs created by the subdivision and the
benefits of the required dedication. It held that "where [the dedication of
land for streets] is a condition reasonably related to increased traffic and other
needs of the proposed subdivision it is voluntary in theory and not contrary to
constitutional concepts." 69 Relying in part on the voluntariness and privilege
theories, the court found that the subdivider sought the advantages of lot
subdivision. Therefore, he had to comply with reasonable conditions
imposed to protect the "safety and general welfare of the lot owners in the
subdivision and of the public."' 70 Thus, the exaction dedication requirement
was a reasonable exercise of the police power, not a compensable taking.
A lower California court recently applied this test to an ordinance that
required the payment of user impact fees. In Building Industry Association of
Southern California v. City of Oxnard,7 ' the court held that the impact fees were
61. Pavelko, supra note 8,at 283.
62. Johnston, supra note 46, at 876.
63. D. MANDELKER, supra note 9, at 268.
64. See Pavelko, supra note 8, at 283.
65. 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949).
66.

Id.

67. Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976),
cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 955 (1977).
68. See, e.g., Howard County v.JJM, Inc., 301 Md. 256, 482 A.2d 908 (1984).
69. 34 Cal. 2d at 42, 207 P.2d at 8.
70. Id. at 42, 207 P.2d at 7.
71. 150 Cal. App. 3d 535 (text of opinion not printed), 198 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1984), vacated, 40 Cal.
3d 1, 706 P.2d 285, 218 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1985).
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not a valid police power measure but a mask for discriminatory taxation. To
determine whether the fees actually were a valid police power device, the
court applied the reasonable relationship test as stated in Liberty v. California
72
Coastal Commission:
Whether there has been a reasonable exercise of the police power is a question for the
court. Where the conditions imposed are not related to the use being made of the
property but are imposed because the [governmental] entity conceives a means of
shifting the burden of providing the cost of a public benefit to another not responsible
for or only remotely or speculatively
benefiting from it, there is an unreasonable
73
exercise of the police power.

The Oxnard court found no reasonable relationship between the impact fees
and the need for public improvements generated by the assessed
developments. Instead, the fees were "designed to collect revenue for
'general purpose capital needs' benefiting the community as a whole." 7 4
The test enunciated in Ayres has also been employed by other state courts.
In Call v. City of West Jordan,75 the Utah Supreme Court determined that this
test should be applied to an ordinance requiring the dedication of land or an
in-lieu fee for flood control or park and recreational facilities. It held that the
plaintiff subdividers should have an opportunity to present evidence on this
issue and remanded the case to the lower court to afford them that
76
opportunity.
The Maryland Court of Appeals also recently applied the reasonable
relationship test. Howard County v. JJM, Inc. 7 7 addressed a county statute that
required the developer to reserve, rather than dedicate, a right of way within
the subdivision for a proposed state road. The land was to be reserved for an
"indefinite period of time." 7 8 Following the line of reasoning employed in
Ayres, the court asked "whether the proposed subdivision reasonably
generates the need for the highway in question." 79 Finding that the exaction
deprived the developer of any use of his land and that the county had not
shown a reasonable nexus between the exaction and the proposed
subdivision, the court held the statute unconstitutional as applied. 80
2. The Specifically and Uniquely Attributable Test. The Illinois courts have
adopted a test diametrically opposed to the reasonable relationship test. In
1961, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of
Mount Prospect,8 l set forth a very stringent test. The court specified that the
need for the subdivision exaction must be specifically and uniquely
72.
73.

113 Cal. App. 3d 491, 502-03, 170 Cal. Rptr. 247, 254 (1980).
150 Cal. App. at -, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 65 (citation omitted).

74.

Id. at -, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 66.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980).
Id at 1259.
301 Md. 256, 482 A.2d 908 (1984).
Id. at 260, 482 A.2d at 910.
Id. at 258, 482 A.2d at 909.
Id. at 282, 482 A.2d at 921.
22 Ill.
2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
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82
attributable to the subdivider's activity in order to be found permissible.
Absent this relationship, the exaction would be "a confiscation of private
property in contravention of the constitutional prohibitions rather than [a]
reasonable regulation under the police power." 83 Applying this strict
standard, the court held that the required dedication of land for school and
recreational facilities, although desirable, was impermissible. The court
explained:

[T]his record does not establish that the need for recreational and educational
facilities . . . is one that is specifically and uniquely attributable to the addition of the
subdivision and which should be cast upon the subdivider as his sole financial burden
....
[T]he present school facilities of Mount Prospect are near capacity. This is the
result of the total development of the community. If this whole community had not
developed to such an extent or if the existing school facilities were greater, the
purported need supposedly would not be present. Therefore, on the record in this
case the school problem which allegedly exists here is one which the subdivider should
not be obliged to pay the total cost of remedying, and to so construe the statute would
84
amount to an exercise of the power of eminent domain without compensation.

Thus, although the court found that the addition of the houses in the new
subdivision would aggravate the problem, it was unwilling to make the
developer pay for part of the remedy.
The specifically and uniquely attributable test has been generally accepted
by the Illinois courts as the standard for determining the reasonableness of
subdivision exactions. 85 In Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove,8 6 the court applied
the test and struck down an in-lieu fee requirement. In a later application of
the test to an internal street exaction, the court also held the requirement
unconstitutional.8 7 In Board of Education v. Surety Developers,88 however, the
court found that the test had been satisfied. It held that the conditions
imposed on the subdivider were reasonable in light of the subdivision's
contribution to the creation of the school problem. The court also found that
the test had been met in Krughoff v. City of Naperville,89 where in-lieu fees for
parks and schools were "fairly proportioned to the need for new ... facilities
created by the proposed developments." 90
Courts in several other states have also applied the specifically and
uniquely attributable test. In Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston,9 1 the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that park and recreational land dedication
requirements are acceptable, but only when the strict Pioneer Trust test has
been met. It also held that an ordinance with a set percentage requirement
was arbitrary and unreasonable, but that a land dedication requirement that
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 380, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
Id.
Id. at 381-82, 176 N.E.2d at 802.
See Pavelko, supra note 8, at 285.
19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960).
Exchange Nat'l Bank v. City of Lake Forest, 40 111. 2d 281, 239 N.E.2d 819 (1968).
63 Ill. 2d 193, 347 N.E.2d 149 (1975).
68 Ill. 2d 352, 369 N.E.2d 892 (1977).
Id. at 359, 369 N.E.2d at 895.
107 R.I. 63, 264 A.2d 910 (1970).
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was specifically and uniquely attributable to the new subdivision would be
92
appropriate and more equitable.
Courts in Oregon and Connecticut have applied the specifically and
uniquely attributable test to in-lieu payment requirements. In Haugen v.
Gleason,93 the Oregon Supreme Court characterized the in-lieu fee
requirement as a tax and held that the city did not have the authority to
impose it on subdividers. In addition, the court held that even if the city had
the authority to impose the fee requirement, it was unconstitutional unless the
money collected was earmarked for expenditures that would benefit the
regulated subdivision. Similarly, a Connecticut court invalidated a regulation
authorizing in-lieu payments because no provision specifically required that
the money collected be spent in a manner directly beneficial to the regulated
94
subdivision.
More recently, the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied the test to a
local exaction ordinance that required the dedication of seven and a half
percent of the total acreage of a subdivision or the payment of an in-lieu fee. 9 5
Because evidence was produced that indicated that the town did not need or
intend to use the dedicated land, the court held that the requirement was
96
arbitrary and unconstitutional.
Thus, the specifically and uniquely attributable test requires that there be a
"spatial proximity between the improvement and the [developer's] property,
a correlation between the cost and the provable benefit, and an improvement
capable of being exactly financed or proportioned. ' 9 7 Several courts have
rejected this test because of these strict standards. One court actually
acknowledged the test as "an acceptable statement of the yardstick to be
applied," 9 8 but did not apply it because of the proof problems its restrictive
application would cause:
In most instances it would be impossible for the municipality to prove that the land
required to be dedicated for a park or a school site was to meet a need solely
attributable to the anticipated
influx of people into the community to occupy this
99
particular subdivision.

Other courts have preferred to apply more flexible standards that permit
municipalities to require contributions from small developments that
generate needs but that cannot dedicate large pieces of land, or from those
that generate needs for new or improved services in conjunction with other
new developments.
92.

Id. at

70-71, 264 A.2d at 913-14.

93. 226 Or. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1961).
94. Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 27 Conn. 74, 230 A.2d 45 (1967).
95. J.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 432 A.2d 12 (1981).
96. Id. at 584, 432 A.2d at 14.
97. Holmes v. Planning Bd., 78 A.D.2d 1, 17, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 598 (1980).
98. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 617, 137 N.W.2d 442, 447 (1965),
appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
99. Id. at 617, 137 N.W.2d at 447.
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3. The Rational Nexus Test. In Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 00 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court set forth a new and more moderate standard for
assessing exaction validity.' 0 ' The court's rational nexus test required a
reasonable connection between the exaction and the needs created by or the
benefits conferred upon the new subdivision.' 0 2 Under this test, the court
would not declare a regulation unconstitutional simply because the proposed
subdivision had not solely created the need. Instead, it would find a
reasonable basis for the imposition of the regulation if "a group of
subdivisions approved over a period of several years had been responsible for
bringing into the community a considerable number of people" which
necessitated the provision of additional educational and recreational
facilities.' 0 3 A subdivider could overcome the presumption of the exaction's
validity, however, by providing evidence demonstrating that
(i) the municipality already has adequate land for parks to meet its present and
future needs;
(ii) normal growth, irrespective of the growth due to the subdivision, would make the
land acquisition necessary; or,
(iii) the subdivision will merely cause 10an4 intramunicipality population shift and not
result in a substantial influx of people.

If such evidence was not provided, the collection of in-lieu fees to finance the
improvements would be allowed.
The Jordan court also impliedly required a reasonable connection between
the expenditure of the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the
assessed subdivision. 10 5 The court would not hold the exaction to be
unreasonable simply because some of the benefits resulting from the
improved facilities would accrue to the general public. Nevertheless, the
reasonableness of the exaction would depend on a factual inquiry into the
relationship between the expenditure of the funds and the benefits accruing
06
to the subdivision.'
AlthoughJordan involved the payment of in-lieu fees, the court considered
the constitutionality of subdivision exactions generally. It first determined
that an exaction dedication requirement would be deemed constitutional if it
met the rational nexus test. 10 7 It then considered the constitutionality of an
100. 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965).
101. A Florida court described the rational nexus approach articulated by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in Jordan as providing "a more feasible basis for testing subdivision dedication requirements"
than the specifically and uniquely attributable test or the reasonable relationship standard. Wald
Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 338 So. 2d 863, 868 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 348
So. 2d 955 (1977).
102. 28 Wis. 2d at 618-19, 137 N.W.2d at 448; see also Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 10, at
430-33.
103. 28 Wis. 2d at 617-18, 137 N.W.2d at 447.
104.

Id. at 618, 137 N.W.2d at 448; see also Gordon, Subdivision Exactions Draw Challenges from

Developers, Legal Times of Wash., Sept. 2, 1985, at A4, col. 3, A14, col. 3.
105. 28 Wis. 2d at 617-18, 137 N.W.2d at 447; see also Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 10, at
432.
106. SeeJuergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 10, at 432.
107. The court did not actually use the term "rational nexus" to describe its test. See
Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 10, at 431 n.93.
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equalization fee charged in lieu of the dedication. Although the municipality
was not specifically authorized to charge the fee, the court found that its
purpose was closely tied to the purpose of the authorized dedication
requirement. Therefore, the equalization fee was also legal and a
constitutional exercise of the police power, where the subdivided tract of land
was so small that a dedication requirement would have been impractical. 1 0 8
Courts in several other states have applied the test developed in Jordan.
For example, the court in Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 1o9
applied the rational nexus test although the plaintiff argued that it should
have applied the stricter specifically and uniquely attributable test. Holding
that the city ordinance would "be justified on the basis of a general public
need for recreational facilities caused by present and future subdivisions," 110
the California Supreme Court explained:
We see no persuasive reason in the face of these urgent needs caused by present and
anticipated future population growth on the one hand and the disappearance of open
land on the other to hold that a statute requiring the dedication of land by a
subdivider may be justified only upon the ground that the particular subdivider upon
whom an exaction has been imposed will, solely by the development of his
subdivision, increase the need for recreational facilities to such an extent that
additional land for such facilities will be required.I 1 '

Because the need for the facilities was generated in part by the plaintiff's
subdivision, the court upheld the ordinance authorizing land dedications or
in-lieu fees.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Land/Vest Properties,Inc. v. Town of
Plainfield,112 considered the constitutionality of a requirement that a
subdivider upgrade two off-site access roads. Because two residences and
three undeveloped lots bordered on the roads and the required
improvements were to extend well beyond the proposed subdivision, the
court determined that it would be inequitable to impose the entire cost of
improving the roads on the subdivider. 1 13 Instead, the court held that a
subdivider should be required to bear only "that portion of the cost [of the
off-site improvements] that bears a rational nexus to the needs created by,
and special benefits conferred upon, the subdivision." ' 1 4 The determination
of the subdivider's appropriate portion of the cost would involve a factual
inquiry into such matters as the road maintenance standard currently applied,
the frontage of the subdivision, the potential traffic increase, and the number
1 15
of homes currently fronting on the roads.
108. 28 Wis. 2d at 608, 618-23, 137 N.W.2d at 448-50.
109. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971), appealdismissed, 404 U.S. 878 (1972).
110. Id. at 638, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 634.
111. Id. at 639-40, 484 P.2d at 611, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
112. 117 N.H. 817, 379 A.2d 200 (1977).
113. Id. at 822, 379 A.2d at 204.
114. Id. at 823, 379 A.2d at 204 (citing Longridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 52 N.J. 348, 350,
245 A.2d 336, 337 (1960)).
115. Id. at 824, 379 A.2d at 205.
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In Wald Corp. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 116 a Florida court rejected both
the reasonable relationship test and the specifically and uniquely attributable
test. While the former test would allow local governments too much
discretion in the imposition of subdivision exactions and too much
opportunity to interfere with private property, the latter test was deemed
excessively restrictive. The Florida court preferred the more moderate
rational nexus test. Explaining its choice, the court described the standard as
one that
allows the local authorities to implement future oriented comprehensive planning
without according undue deference to legislative judgments. It requires a balancing of
the prospective needs of the community and the property rights of the developer. But
above all, it treats the business of subdividing as a profitmaking enterprise, thus
drawing proper distinctions between the individual property holder and the
subdivider. While the former may not ordinarily have his property appropriated
to dedicate land
without an eminent domain proceeding, the latter may be required
1 17
where the requirement is part of a valid regulatory scheme.

The court applied the test to the dedication requirements at issue. A
subdivider had challenged the constitutionality of a county ordinance that
required the dedication of land for canal rights of way and maintenance
easements.' 18 Part of the justification for the requirement was that the
county's adopted water control plan included the canal system. As a result,
the court found that the drainage provisions would benefit the subdivision
itself, as well as land located both upstream and downstream, by protecting
them from periodic flooding."19 Thus, the requirements constituted a valid
exercise of the police power.
4. Variations. In several cases, courts have applied tests that are essentially
variations on the three tests discussed above. A few courts have adopted a
test that is even more generous than the reasonable relationship test as
applied in California. This judicial deference test, created by the Montana
Supreme Court in Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 120 establishes a
"virtually irrefutable presumption in favor of the exaction."' 2 1 It provides for
the automatic acceptance of a legislative determination in favor of an
exaction, unless the developer produces evidence demonstrating that the
exaction is unreasonable. 2 2 Thus, if the legislature had enacted a statute
authorizing municipalities to exact dedications and fees from developers
because of the increased demand on services and facilities resulting from new
subdivisions, a reviewing court would accept the legislature's policy decision.
In Billings, the court considered a statute that declared itself to have been
enacted pursuant to the state's police power, and that required the dedication
116.

338 So. 2d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 348 So. 2d 955 (1977).

117.

Id. at 868.

118.

Id. at 864.

119.

Id. at 868.

120.
121.
122.

144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
Gordon, supra note 104, at A14, col. 4.
144 Mont. at 35, 394 P.2d at 188.
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of land for parks and playgrounds. 23 The court found that the subdivider
voluntarily decided to subdivide the land and the statute was the state's
response to that decision. As such, the imposition of reasonable conditions
24
on the right to develop fell within the state's police power authority.'
Rather than determine for itself whether the subdivision created the need for
the parks and playgrounds, the court deferred to the legislature. With a bit of
circular reasoning, it found that the legislature had already answered the
reasonableness question by enacting the law that required land
dedications.

25

The superficial review provided by this test resembles the standard applied
under the earlier privilege test.' 26 Under both tests, the municipality enjoys
broad discretion to regulate subdividers. The difference between the tests lies
in the protections provided. The privilege test provided the subdivider no
protection from the imposition of arbitrary and unreasonable conditions. The
judicial deference test, however, permits the presentation of evidence to rebut
27
the presumption of validity.
This test has been applied in other situations as well. In Jenad, Inc. v.
Village of Scarsdale,128 the New York Court of Appeals emphasized a similar
police power rationale. At issue in that case was the imposition of an in-lieu
fee requirement that would benefit the entire community. The statute at issue
in Billings, on the other hand, imposed a requirement that would directly
benefit the subdivision subject to the exaction. Thus, it appears that this test
requires a showing only that the statute is substantially related to the state's
police powers. It does not require that the legislation be reasonably related to
12 9
the particular subdivision.
A restrictive variation, more closely related to the specifically and uniquely
attributable test, was set forth in Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Town of Newburgh. 130
In that case, a New York court required a showing that the regulation would
directly benefit the subdivision. The court held that the ordinance at issue,
which required the payment of in-lieu fees, was unreasonable and constituted
a taking.131 The ordinance provided that the funds collected were to be used
for "neighborhood park, playground or recreation purposes including the
acquisition of property."' 3 2 The court found that this exaction was
unreasonable because the funds collected could be used anywhere in the
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 30, 394 P.2d at 184-85.
Id. at 32, 394 P.2d at 186.
Id. at 35, 394 P.2d at 188.

126.
127.

See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
Pavelko, supra note 8, at 283.

128.

129.
sources
130.
(1962).
131.
132.

18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).

See Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 301 Md. 256, 276-77, 482 A.2d 908, 918 (1984), and
cited therein.
25 Misc. 2d 1004, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), afd, 15 A.D.2d 815, 225 N.Y.S.2d 538
Id. at 1008, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 733.
Id. at 1007, 209 N.Y.S.2d at 732.
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town, and were not earmarked for expenditures directly benefiting the
33
subdivision residents.
This direct benefit test is based on the special assessment doctrine, a tax
law principle. The special assessment doctrine provides that the costs of a
service or improvement performed by the local government may be levied
against real property if the benefits of the improvement will accrue directly to
the assessed property.' 34 The restrictiveness of this test makes it difficult to
maintain. As a result, the New York Court of Appeals has expressly overruled
the decision in Gulest. 15
III
THE NEED TO UNIFY THE EXISTING TESTS

The tests discussed in Section II of this article were originally designed to
assess the validity of traditional subdivision exactions. Different concerns
arise when major user impact fees are at issue. Although the available tests
of major user impact
are not suited to the assessment of the constitutionality
36
fees, courts continue to attempt to apply them.'
The proliferation of divergent state tests and the absence of a federal test
have given rise to several problems. For example, in choosing from among
the three existing tests, courts must decide whether they prefer: (1) the
vagueness of the reasonable relationship standard in which some benefit
ultimately accruing to the subdivision is sufficient; (2) the excessive strictness
of the specifically and uniquely attributable test and the ensuing difficulty the
municipality faces in demonstrating the cause and effect relationship between
the particular subdivision and the public improvement exacted; or (3) the
fundamental neutrality of the rational nexus test. Furthermore, courts
attempting to apply the tests often confuse the various standards.
Occasionally, a court will enunciate one standard and actually apply
another.' 3 7 More frequently, courts will refer to some of the tests
interchangeably. 38 In some cases, courts have begun to retreat from their
39

polar positions. 1

One problem inherent in some of these tests is that they consider only the
needs leading to the imposition of the regulation, the benefits accruing from
133. Id.; 290 N.Y.S.2d at 732-33.
134. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 10, at 429; Smith, supra note 31, at 6.
135. Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966).
136. See, e.g., Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976),
reconsidered on appealfrom unpublished remand, 358 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (amended
exaction held legal), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 458, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979); Banberry Dev. Corp.
v. South Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981).
137. See, e.g., Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965)
(professing acceptance of specifically and uniquely attributable test but actually applying new rational
nexus test), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
138. See, e.g., Howard County v. jjM, Inc., 301 Md. 256, 280-81, 482 A.2d 908, 920 (1984)
(mixing rational nexus and reasonable relationship tests).
139. See, e.g., Plote, Inc. v. Minnesota Alden Co., 96 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1006-07, 422 N.E.2d 231,
235-36 (1981) (dictum showing that Illinois courts are tending toward a less restrictive test).
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the regulation, or neither.' 40 A balanced and equitable test must consider
both of these elements.14 1 In addition, decisions regarding the validity of
subdivision exactions and user impact fees should turn on the particular fact
situation. Therefore, a court should adopt a flexible test that allows for
varying treatment based on factual determinations. A court could therefore
"accord more deferential treatment to the municipality's interests" when an
exaction for on-site improvements is at issue and some need-benefit
relationship to the new subdivision is assured. 14 2 At the same time, when
major off-site improvements are planned, the court could require a greater
demonstration of the need for the regulation and a reasonable connection
43
between the regulation and the new development.
The consolidation of the existing tests into one unified, flexible test,
applicable to subdivision exactions, user impact fees, and linkage, would
simplify court review of these regulations and reduce the current confusion.
An inquiry into the need created by the proposed development and the nexus
between that need and the public benefits deriving from the imposition of the
regulation is thus a preferable approach. To be equitable, such an inquiry
must also balance the "legitimate interests of the developer and the general
welfare concerns and power of the municipality." 1 44
IV
THE PROPOSED NEEDS-NEXUS TEST

From the tests currently used to assess validity under the U.S.
Constitution, it is possible to derive an equitable test that would consider the
need-benefit relationships and balance the interests of local governments,
developers, and consumers and yet remain understandable and simple to
apply. In essence, the proposed new test, called the needs-nexus test,
reaffirms the rational nexus test in slightly amended form as it pertains to
subdivision exactions, while adapting it to fit the more complex issues and
equities presented by user impact fees and linkage.

140. This problem is inherent in the specifically and uniquely attributable and direct benefit tests.
See supra text accompanying notes 81-99, 130-35.
141. Courts applying the rational nexus test have considered both needs and benefits. See, e.g.,
Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 606, 611-12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Jordan v.
Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442, appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
142. Pavelko, supra note 8, at 291.
143. Id. at 292.
144. Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 10, at 433.
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A chart setting forth the proposed new needs-nexus test is offered below:
NEEDS-NEXUS TEST
Subdivision Exactions

User Impact Fees/Linkage
Authority

State enabling authority
Local enacting ordinance

a)

State enabling authority

b)

Local enacting ordinance

Imposed at subdivision

c)

Imposed at development

a)

Area-wide or regional need

Need
a)

Attributable to subdivision

a)

Legitimate governmental police
power objective; promotes
public health, safety, welfare

a)

Legitimate governmental police
power objective; promotes
public health, safety, welfare

b)

Reasonable relation between
public need served and exaction
imposed

b)

Less intrusive alternatives not
available

c)
d)

Burden of proof on subdivider
Amount of exaction is equitable

c)

Burden of proof on government
Amount of fee or linkage is
equitable

A.

Authority

Nexus

d)

A court applying the needs-nexus test would first determine whether the
municipality is authorized to impose the subdivision exaction, user impact fee,
or linkage requirement. In order to find that a municipality has such
authorization, state enabling legislation and a local enactment ordinance must
exist. 14 5 The same assessment would be made for subdivision exactions and
user impact fees or linkage requirements. If authorization is found to exist,
the court would then evaluate the constitutionality of the requirement by
applying the next two steps of the test to ascertain the existence of the
requisite need and nexus.
B.

Need and Nexus

The need and nexus prongs of the test require inquiries into the source of
the needs generated and the legitimacy and degree of governmental interest.
Under this test, reviewing courts will scrutinize user impact fees and linkage
more closely than traditional subdivision exactions. Therefore, a reviewing
court must begin its application of the need and nexus prongs by determining
whether the regulation at issue is a traditional subdivision exaction or a user
impact fee. To make this determination, the definitions of subdivision
exaction, user impact fee, and linkage provided in Section I of this article
should be applied.
145.
146.

46

1

See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
See supra pp. 139-40.
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When a traditional subdivision exaction is at issue, the court will ask
whether there is evidence that the need for the exaction was generated by the
proposed subdivision. In order to find that an exaction dedication or
construction of a facility is valid, there must exist a reasonable connection
between the exaction and the needs created by or the benefits conferred upon
the subdivision. Where only part of the need is generated by a particular
proposal, the government may properly assess in-lieu fees equal to only that
percentage. Thus, the subdivider will only pay for improvements resulting
from the need created by the subdivision.
The reviewing court will also require evidence that the exaction rationally
relates to a legitimate governmental objective. 14 7 The burden of proof on this
issue is placed on the subdivider to demonstrate that there is no legitimate
governmental objective. A legitimate objective is one that promotes the
public health, safety, or welfare.' 4 8 Recently, several courts reviewing
subdivision exactions have expressly required that, to be considered valid
exercises of a state's police power, exactions must be adopted to meet
legitimate governmental objectives.' 4 9 For instance, in a case involving a park
land dedication ordinance, the Texas Supreme Court held that a valid
regulation "must be 'substantially related' to the health, safety or general
0
welfare of the people."15
Where user impact fees are at issue, the reviewing court will conduct a
similar need and nexus inquiry into the validity of the regulations. After
determining whether a legitimate governmental objective exists, the court will
ask whether there is evidence that the proposed development would
contribute to a regional or area-wide need. Because it is possible to assess
impact fees proportionately, the proposed development does not have to
generate the entire need for the improvement. Instead, the development
need only contribute to the condition requiring the public improvement. For
example, the municipality may assess user impact fees to pay for a new school
when the proposed development has contributed to the need for increased
school capacity.
However, the burden of proof at this point would shift to the government
to demonstrate that the need for user impact fees, as distinguished from
subdivision exactions, cannot be satisfied by less intrusive alternatives, such as
the real property tax. Additionally, the court will use a heightened standard
of review in evaluating the government's case. This standard would entail
close scrutiny, somewhat analogous to the strict scrutiny analysis employed by
147. The legitimate governmental objective requirement is derived from the rational basis
standard ofjudicial review. For a discussion of this standard, see Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal
Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949); see also G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 593-97
(I Ith ed. 1978); R. ROTUNDA, supra note 59, at §§ 15.4, 18.3; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 994-96 (1978); Barrett, The Rational Basis Standardfor Equal hrotection Review of Ordinaty Legislative
Classifications, 68 Ky. L.J. 845, 856-66 (1980).
148. R. ROTUNDA, supra note 59, at §§ 15.4, 18.44.
149. E.g., City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984).
150. Id. at 805.
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courts where fundamental rights or suspect classifications are involved in
fourteenth amendment equal protection challenges.
However, under the
needs-nexus test, a compelling governmental interest in the user impact fee,
linkage, or the underlying public improvement need not necessarily be
shown.' 5 ' The reasons for shifting the burden and departing from the usual
police power reasonableness standard with regard to user impact fees are as
follows:
1. User impact fees represent a marked, if not radical, departure from the
traditional method of financing major public improvements.
2. The costs associated with major off-site infrastructure improvements
funded through user impact fees are typically considerably higher than those
associated with traditional subdivision exactions. Thus, their effect upon the
consumer is likely to be significant.
3. Subjecting residential developments to user impact fees raises
important social, public policy, and constitutional issues, and potentially
affects fundamental rights. These effects may offset the stated public interests
normally cited in support of such fees. The primary issues raised by user
impact fees are exclusion and housing discrimination based on economic
status.
There is substantial potential for a community to abuse the user impact fee
by making it a tool with which to exclude certain economic groups or classes.
Economic discrimination is an ill that remains largely unaddressed by federal
and state civil rights laws. 1 52 With one notable exception, courts have also
largely ignored the issue. The United States Supreme Court has not yet
recognized the claim to affordable housing as a fundamental right protected
by the Constitution.1 53 At the state level, only the New Jersey Supreme Court
in its landmark "Mount Laurel" decisions1 54 has substantively addressed the
question of economic discrimination in housing. In Mount Laurel I, the court
was confronted with a region-wide problem of economic discrimination in
housing, based on the technique of "fiscal zoning." Fiscal zoning is the use of
the police power to enhance the tax base and provide good "ratables," while
precluding or limiting high-density residential zoning in order to discourage
151.

For a discussion of the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review, see G. GUNTHER,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 147, at 588-89, 593; see also R. ROTUNDA, supra note 59, at §§ 15.4,

18.3; L. TRIBE, supra note 147, at 602, 1002; Barrett, supra note 147, at 852-54. For additional
discussion of the strict scrutiny standard, see infra notes 159-62.
152. See, e.g., The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3631 (1982). The Fair Housing Act makes
it unlawful to make available or deny a dwelling to any person "because of race, color, religion, sex,
or natural origin," but does not address discrimination in housing based upon economic status. Id.
at § 3604(a).
153. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974).
154. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (Mt. Laurel 1); Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Fownship of Mt. Laurel, 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mt. Laurel II). In a third case, sometimes
referred to as "Mt. Laurel III," the New jersey Supreme Court upheld the State's Fair Housing Act of
1985 which transferred jurisdiction of pending Mount Laurel cases from the judiciary to a new
agency created by the State Legislature. Hills Dev. Co. v. Bernards Township, 103 N.J. 1, 510 A.2d
621 (1986) (Mt. Laurel III).
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families with large numbers of school-aged children from moving to the
municipality. The court found this practice to be economic discrimination in
violation of the New Jersey Constitution. It therefore directed the affected
municipalities to cease the practice and implement zoning policies that were
designed to provide affordable housing opportunities based on each
municipality's regional fair share of the need for such housing.' 5 5
The user impact fee can adversely affect regional opportunities for
affordable housing to the same degree as the fiscal zoning practices
condemned in the Mt. Laurel I and Mt. Laurel II decisions. This device is a
politically tempting use of police power because most of those who will bear
the burden of the fee are not yet residents, that is, voters, in the community.
This forgotten constituency often consists of young families at the low end of
the economic ladder seeking to purchase their first home. The user impact
fee, like fiscal zoning, offers the municipal legislature an opportunity to
address the difficult problems of financing needed public improvements
without having to risk incurring the wrath of the electorate by increasing real
estate assessments or the tax rate.
Thus, in reviewing a user impact fee ordinance, the court should examine
whether there are less intrusive alternatives available, such as increasing the
general tax rate or using general obligation bonds. In conducting this
examination, the court should consider some or all of the following questions:
- What is the amount of the fee and its likely impact upon the ultimate
consumer when passed through by the developer? For example, in the
case of a dwelling, it has been estimated that over the life of a 30-year
mortgage, a $2,376.00 impact fee results in a total cost to the home
purchaser of $13,878.00.156
- How healthy is the municipality's assessable base? Is it growing or
eroding?
- Is the municipality's tax rate low in comparison to similarly situated
political subdivisions?
- What is the municipality's bond rating? Will increased taxes or
borrowing to fund public improvements jeopardize it?
- Has the municipality's current capital improvements program (CIP)
kept pace with previous programs? How does the current CIP compare
to its predecessors in relation to the current size of the municipality and
growth trends?
- Is the municipality's existing housing stock sufficiently diverse and
inclusionary to accommodate a variety of income groups including lowand moderate-income families?
155. 92 N.J. at 198-99, 456 A.2d at 410. The failure of Mount Laurel and other communities to
implement the court's directives in M. Laurel I gave rise to this Alt. Laurel II litigation several years
later.
156. NAHB DEVELOPER'S MANUAL, supra note 37, at 3-4. If the fee is imposed on nonresidential
development, the inquiry would focus on its effect on employment opportunities, sales tax
collections, increased disposable income, and economic development of the community.
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- Is the fee, in reality, a double tax on the consumer? In other words,
is the new-home purchaser, who, like existing residents, pays deductible
property taxes for services, and also must pay a nondeductible impact fee
for the same service (through the increased price of the home),
I5 7
essentially paying twice?
by
The reviewing court should also consider several of the factors 15raised
8
City:
Jordan
South
v.
Corp.
Dev.
Banberry
in
Court
the Utah Supreme
- What are the costs of existing capital facilities and how have they
been financed?
- Has the property charged with the fee already contributed to the
costs of existing facilities? To what extent will it contribute to the
cost of existing facilities in the future?
- Is the affected property being credited for providing common
facilities that the municipality has provided without charge to other
properties in the service area?
- What extraordinary costs, if any, will be incurred in serving the
affected property?
- Has a time-price
differential been included in making
comparisons of amounts paid by the affected property and other
properties at different times?
The answers to these questions do not all have to favor the government's
position in order for the government to demonstrate that less intrusive
alternatives to the user impact fee are unavailable. If, on balance, however,
the answers to many of these questions are adverse to the imposition of the
fee, the court should hold that the government has not sustained its burden.
To recapitulate, under the nexus portion of the test, the burden of proof
would shift to the municipality to demonstrate that less intrusive means of
financing the needed public improvements are unavailable. In reviewing the
requirement, the court would use a close scrutiny standard rather than the
minimal scrutiny criterion applicable to equal protection claims, or the
reasonableness standard normally applied in weighing due process challenges
to police power actions.
The needs and nexus prongs of the test also address the equity of the
regulation. Once again, the assessment is more stringent for user impact fees
or linkage requirements than for subdivision exactions because of the
former's potentially greater impact upon the consumer. For an exaction to
withstand scrutiny under the equity analysis, the government must show that a
reasonable relationship exists between the public need served by it and the
type and extent of the exaction. The municipality may not impose the
exaction arbitrarily, 1M1 and the amount of the exaction must be equitable,
157. See id. at 4.
158. 631 P.2d 899, 903-05 (Utah 1981); see also Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982).
159. A requirement that bears no relationship to the promotion of public health and safety is
arbitrary and capricious. E.g., Coates v. Planning Bd., 58 N.Y.2d 800, 802, 445 N.E.2d 642, 643, 459
N.Y.S.2d 259, 260 (1983).
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given the need directly created by the proposed subdivision. In making such
an assessment, the Texas Supreme Court recently inquired into the
reasonableness of the connection between the development of a subdivision
and the increased park and recreation needs in the neighborhood for which
exactions were sought.' 60 Additionally, the municipality may not impose the
entire cost of an improvement on a development through exaction dedication
or in-lieu fee requirements where the development generates only a portion
of the need for the improvement. Only those costs fairly attributable to the
6
subdivision may be imposed through exactions.' '
As applied to user impact fees and linkage, equity requires that there be no
less intrusive alternatives available to achieve the stated governmental
objective.' 6 2 Examples of less intrusive alternatives could, in certain
circumstances, include special assessment taxes, general revenue bond issues
or federal or state grants. The government should bear the burden of
demonstrating the absence of less intrusive alternatives.
Furthermore, as was the case for subdivision exactions, the amount of the
burden imposed through user impact fees and linkage may not exceed the fair
share of the need imposed by the development itself. For instance, a Florida
court has upheld an ordinance that employed a formula to determine a
development's fair share of the costs of road construction. 63 The ordinance
set different fees for single-family houses, multifamily houses, mobile homes,
and commercial units, since the different types of land uses generate varying
numbers of motor vehicle trips. 164
In summary, the new needs-nexus test for subdivision exactions, user
impact fees, and linkage requires first that the municipality be authorized to
impose the regulation. The reviewing court must then consider the new
development or subdivision's relationship to the need for the improvement,
the government's interest in enacting the regulation, the equity of the
regulation as determined by its necessity, and the fairness of the amount
imposed. A reviewing court applying the needs-nexus test will uphold a
regulation if all of these elements are found to exist.
V
LEGAL RATIONALE FOR THE NEEDS-NEXUS

TEST

As described above,' 6 5 the proposed needs-nexus test draws a distinction
between traditional subdivision exactions and the newer user impact fees and
linkage. This distinction is based on the different degrees and types of need
created by proposed developments and the nexus between the need created
160.

City of College Station v. Turtle Rock Corp., 680 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. 1984).

161.

See supra text accompanying note 115.

162. R. ROTUNDA, supra note 59, at § 18.3.
163. Home Builders & Contractors Ass'n v. Board of County Comm'rs, 446 So. 2d 140 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983), appeal dismissed, 469 U.S. 976-77 (1984).
164. Id. at 142.

165.

See supra section IV.
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and the public benefit to be served by imposing the regulation. At the same
time, courts applying the test will consider similar elements (that is, authority,
need, nexus, and equity) regardless of whether subdivision exactions or user
impact fees or linkage are in dispute.
The new needs-nexus test refines and consolidates the existing
proliferation of tests that courts presently use to determine whether particular
subdivision exactions and user impact fees or linkage have been authorized
and constitutionally imposed. The result is a flexible, unified test that can be
applied to both traditional on-site subdivision exactions and modern off-site
user impact fees and linkage.
In addition, the new test ensures that municipalities' use of these
regulations will not infringe upon constitutionally protected property rights.
Regulations may not be imposed if they violate the equal protection or due
process provisions of the Constitution, if they would constitute a taking
without compensation, or if they exceed the municipality's police power
authority. The legitimate governmental objective, reasonable relationship,
and no less intrusive alternative components of the test are derived from
standards generally used in equal protection and due process review.
As stated in the preceding section, equal protection and exclusionary
concerns necessitate the requirement that the local government assume the
burden of demonstrating the absence of less intrusive alternatives when user
impact fees or linkage are at issue. User impact fees and linkage require large
expenditures by developers that, in whole or in part, are passed through to
the consumer, resulting in higher housing prices or commercial rental
rates.' 6 6 To impose these costs on the developer and the new users of the
development, rather than on the general populace, is inequitable unless no
alternative financing exists. The increased prices also potentially exclude
many prospective residents from high growth areas by making already scarce
low- and moderate-income housing even more difficult to find. 16 7 In
particular, first-time home buyers with limited financial resources will have an
68
increasingly difficult time finding affordable new housing.'
166. D. MANDELKER, supra note 9, at 271-72; ULI Statement, supra note 37, at 19.
In addition, according to the National Association of Home Builders:
The imposition of impact fees on new development can also produce a ripple effect
throughout an entire housing market, affecting both new home sales and existing home resales.
When impact fees and other cost factors contribute to escalating new home selling prices,
prospective home buyers may be restricted to the resale market, resulting in a windfall for
owners of older units.
NAHB DEVELOPER'S MANUAL, supra note 37, at 5.

One commentator, however, sees the imposition of fees as an attempt by the municipality to
recapture part of the increase in land values it has "given" to landowners over the years. Hagman,
Exactions, User Fees andAssessments: What Are the Limits?, in 1983 ZONING AND PLANNING LAw HANDBOOK
45.
167.

See Heyman & Gilhool, supra note 15, at 1134; see also NAHB DEVELOPER'S MANUAL, supra

note 37, at 1, 5; Weitz, Impact Fees: There Is No Free Lunch, PLAN., July 1984, at 12.
168.

See NAHB DEVELOPER'S MANUAL, supra note 37, at 1, 5.

In

1980, an appellate court in

Oregon found that every $1,000 increase in housing costs excluded an additional nine percent of the
market. State Hous. Council v. City of Lake Oswego, 48 Or. App. 525, 532, 617 P.2d 655, 659
(1980), appeal dismissed, 291 Or. 878, 635 P.2d 647 (1981).
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In addition, it is inequitable to force the costs of these major
improvements on new purchasers and renters alone. The funds or land and
facilities acquired through these regulations have been traditionally supplied
by local governments. Historically, all local residents have helped to bear
these costs since governments obtained the funds through taxing and other
revenue raising powers. Local governments are still responsible for the
provision of services and facilities that benefit the whole community.' 69 Thus,
to impose an additional charge solely upon the new homeowner or tenant
raises basic questions of social equity. As expressed by the New Jersey
Supreme Court:
But as to services which traditionally have been supported by general taxation, other
considerations are evident. The dollar burden would likely be unequal if new homes
were subjected to a charge in addition to the general tax rate. As to education, for
example, the vacant land has contributed for years to the cost of existing educational
facilities, and that land and the dwellings to be erected will continue to contribute with
all other real property to the payment of bonds issued for the existing facilities and to
the cost of renovating or replacing those facilities. Hence, there would be an
imbalance if new construction alone were to bear the capital cost of new schools while
being also charged with the capital costs of schools serving other portions of the
school district. 170

The same analysis applies to the imposition of charges for other major public
facilities such as highways, central water and sewage treatment facilities, and
landfills.
VI
CONCLUSION

Thirty years ago, Justice Frankfurter foretold that
[y]esterday the active area in this field [of law] was concerned with 'property.' Today it
is 'civil liberties.' Tomorrow it may again be 'property.' Who can say that in a society
with a mixed economy, like ours, these two areas are sharply separated, and that
certain freedoms in relation to property may not again be deemed, as they were in the
past, aspects of individual freedom.'71

Subdivision exaction and its more recent offshoots, user impact fees and
linkage, add credence to Justice Frankfurter's clairvoyance.
The earliest subdivision exactions, requirements that subdividers dedicate
land to the local government for street and utility easement purposes, were
closely tied to the subject subdivision. The needs creating the requirement
were generated by the new residential subdivision and the benefits derived
from the improvements would accrue to that particular property because the
improvements would be placed on-site. Over the last two decades, because of
increased demands and financial constraints experienced by local
governments, other forms of regulations have appeared. These measures
169. Pavelko, supra note 8, at 270-7 1.
170. West Park Ave., Inc. v. Ocean Township, 48 NJ. 122, 126-27, 224 A.2d 1, 3-4 (1966); see also
Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1976), reconsideredon appealfaom
unpublished remand, 358 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (amended exaction held legal), cert.
denied, 370 So. 2d 458, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979).
171. F. FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 19 (1956).
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include such additional subdivision exactions as minor off-site dedication
requirements, in-lieu fees and, more recently, major off-site user impact fees
and linkage. The imposition of these latter devices is not as closely tied to the
needs generated by the new developments or to the benefits that accrue to the
new residents.
Several judicial tests have been used to evaluate the validity of subdivision
exactions and user impact fees. The first inquiry asks whether the
municipality is authorized to impose the exaction or impact fee. If the answer
to this question is affirmative, the regulation's constitutionality is examined.
State courts have applied the reasonable relationship, specifically and
uniquely attributable, and rational nexus tests as well as combinations or offshoots of these three major tests.
Because of problems with these tests and because of the expanding nature
of the regulations imposed, this article proposes a new test for subdivision
exaction, user impact fee, and linkage validity. Under the new test, the
reviewing court would first determine whether the municipality has the

authority to impose the regulation. It would then determine whether the
regulation is a traditional subdivision exaction or one of the newer user
impact fees or linkage. If the regulation is an exaction, the court would ask
whether the need for it is generated by the proposed subdivision, whether
there is a reasonable relationship between the public need served and the
exaction imposed, and whether it serves a legitimate governmental objective.
If a user impact fee or linkage is involved, the court would ask whether there is
a regional or area-wide need to which the proposed development would
contribute, whether this need represents a legitimate governmental objective,
and whether a less intrusive alternative is available. The burden of
responding to the less intrusive alternative inquiry would shift to the
government, and the court would employ a close scrutiny standard. For both
types of regulation, the court would require that the municipality impose only
a fair share contribution on the developer.
The proposed test would thus incorporate standards that are well
established in constitutional law. Courts applying the needs-nexus test would
be able to consider the effects of the regulations on equal protection. They
would also be able to consider exclusionary concerns. In addition, they would
be able to require a somewhat greater nexus between the impact fee or
linkage and the development where major off-site infrastructure requirements
are involved. In this way, courts applying the proposed test to subdivision
exactions and user impact fees or linkage would be better able to consider the
need-benefit relationships, balance the interests of local governments,
developers and consumers, and achieve equitable results.

